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How to deal with malleability of BitCoin transactions
Marcin Andrychowicz⋆, Stefan Dziembowski⋆⋆, Daniel Malinowski⋆ ⋆ ⋆ and Łukasz Mazurek†
University of Warsaw
Abstract. BitCoin transactions are malleable in a sense that given a transaction an adversary can easily construct
an equivalent transaction which has a different hash. This can pose a serious problem in some BitCoin distributed
contracts in which changing a transaction’s hash may result in the protocol disruption and a financial loss. The
problem mostly concerns protocols, which use a ”refund” transaction to withdraw a deposit in a case of the protocol
interruption. In this short note, we show a general technique for creating malleability-resilient “refund” transactions,
which does not require any modification of the BitCoin protocol.
Applying our technique to our previous paper “Fair Two-Party Computations via the BitCoin Deposits” (Cryptology
ePrint Archive, 2013) allows to achieve fairness in any Two-Party Computation using the BitCoin protocol in its
current version.
1 Malleability of BitCoin transactions
We assume that the reader is familiar with the BitCoin protocol and in particular with non-standard transaction scripts
(used e.g. in so-called distributed contracts). For general description of BitCoin, see e.g. [4,1] or BitCoin wiki page
http://en.bitcoin.it/. For the description of non-standard transaction scripts, see [2,1] or Contracts page
http://en.bitcoin.it/wiki/Contracts.
BitCoin transactions are malleable1 in a sense that given a transaction T it is easy to create a functionally identical
transaction T ′ (T and T ′ differs only in the input scripts) which has a different hash2. This gives an adversary an
opportunity to slightly change the transaction sent by a user before it is included in the blockchain. It strongly affects
the distributed contracts which use the hashes of the transactions before broadcasting them.
The source of the malleability is the fact that in the current version of the BitCoin protocol, each transaction
contains a hash of the whole transaction it spends, while the signatures are taken over the simplified version of the
transaction (excluding the input scripts).
The most common scenario in which the malleability of transactions is a problem is the following. Suppose that
there is a transaction Deposit , which should be redeemed by a transaction Fuse3 with time-lock t, but for some reason
Fuse has to be created and signed before Deposit is broadcast.4. In the above scenario a problem arises if the Deposit
transaction is maliciously changed and its version included in the blockchain has a different hash than expected, what
invalidates the transaction Fuse.
In our recent paper [1] we proposed a modification of BitCoin which eliminates the malleability problem. The
idea of this modification was to identify the transactions by the hashes of their simplified versions (excluding the input
scripts). With this modification one can of course still modify the input script of the transaction, but the modified
transaction would have the same hash. We used this improvement of BitCoin to guarantee the correctness of the Fuse
transactions, which had to be sign before broadcasting its input transaction. In this short note we present another
approach to achieving the correctness of Fuse transactions which does not need any modification of the BitCoin
protocol.
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1 See http://en.bitcoin.it/wiki/Transaction_Malleability.
2 This can be done e.g. by adding push and pop commands to the input script
3 Transactions of this kind are sometimes called refund transactions.
4 See e.g. examples 1, 5 and 7 on http://en.bitcoin.it/wiki/Contracts.
2 New technique
Our technique uses a BitCoin-based timed commitment scheme introduced in [2]. We briefly describe this commitment
scheme in Sec. 2.1. Later in Sec. 2.2 we show how to construct Fuse transactions, which are resistant to malleability
and in Sec. 2.3 we apply it to SCS protocol from [1], what leads to a general fair Two-Party Computation protocol,
which is secure in the current version of the BitCoin protocol (in particular, even if transactions are malleable). In
Sec. 2.4 we list other protocols, which can be made resistant to malleability using our technique.
2.1 BitCoin-based timed commitment scheme
Commit(in: T )
in-script: sig
C
([Commit])
out-script(body, σ1, σ2, x):
(verC(body, σ1) ∧H(x) = h) ∨
(verC(body, σ1) ∧ verR(body, σ2))
val: dB
Open(in: Commit)
in-script:
sig
C
([Open ]),⊥, s
out-script(body, σ):
verC(body, σ)
val: dB
Fuse(in: Commit)
in-script:
sigC([Fuse ]), sigR([Fuse ]),⊥
out-script(body, σ): verR(body, σ)
val: dB
tlock: t
dBdB
dB
dBdB
Pre-conditions:
1. The protocol is executed between the Committer C holding the key pair C and the Recipient R holding the key
pair R.
2. The Committer knows the secret string s.
3. The blockchain contains an unredeemed transaction T with value dB, which can be redeemed with the key C.
The CS.Commit(C,R, d, t, s) phase:
1. The Committer computes h = H(s) and broadcasts the transaction Commit . This obviously means that he
reveals h, as it is a part of the transaction Commit.
2. The Committer waits until the transaction Commit is confirmed. Then, he creates the body of the transactions
Fuse , signs it and sends the signature to the Recipient.
3. If the Recipient does not receive the signature or the signature is incorrect, then he quits the protocol.
The CS.Open(C,R, d, t, s) phase:
4. The Committer broadcasts the transaction Open , what reveals the secret s.
5. If within time t the transaction Open does not appear on the blockchain then the Recipient broadcasts the trans-
action Fuse and gains dB.
Fig. 1. The CS protocol. The scripts’ arguments, which are omitted are denoted by ⊥.
In this section we briefly describe a timed commitment scheme from [2], which will be denoted CS. The protocol
CS is executed between the Committer (denoted C) and the Recipient (denoted R). During the commitment phase
the Committer commits himself to some string s by revealing its hash h = H(s). Moreover the parties agree on a
moment of time t until which the Committer should open the commitment, i.e. reveal the secret value s. The protocol
is constructed in such a way that if the Committer does not open the commitment until time t, then the agreed amount of
dB is transfered from the Committer to the Recipient. More precisely, at the beginning of the protocol the Committer
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makes a deposit of dB, which is returned to him if he opens the commitment before time t or taken by the Recipient
otherwise.
We follow the notation from [2,1] in which the transactions are represented as boxes. The graph of transactions
and the full description of the CS protocol is presented on Fig. 1. Refer to [2] for more details. Notice that even if the
transaction Commit is maliciously changed before being included in the block, the protocol still succeeds because
the transaction Fuse is created after Commit is included in the blockchain, so it always contains the correct hash of
Commit . Therefore, the CS protocol is resistant to transaction malleability.
The execution of the commitment phase with C as the Committer and R as the Recipient will be denoted by
CS.Commit(C,R, d, t, s), where d is the size of the deposit and t is the time until which C should reveal the secret s.
2.2 Fuse transactions resistant to malleability
Suppose that in the execution of some protocol between the parties A and B there is a transaction Deposit , which
should be redeemed to an address controlled by A at the time t if it is not spent earlier.5 The typical solution would
be to create a transaction Fuse with time-lock t, which is signed by both parties and redeems Deposit . Moreover,
Deposit has to be claimable using signatures of both parties. The graph of transactions for this situation is presented
on Fig. 2.
Deposit(in: T )
in-script: sigA([Deposit ])
out-script(body , σ1, σ2):
(verA(body , σ1) ∧ verB(body , σ2)) ∨
. . .
val: dB
Fuse(in: Deposit)
in-script: sigA([Fuse ]), sigB([Fuse ])
out-script(body , σ): verA(body , σ)
val: dB
tlock: t
dB dB
dB
Fig. 2. The typical solution with the Fuse transaction vulnerable to malleability.
We will now present a technique for creating Fuse transactions, which are resistant to malleability. The general
idea is to use a timed commitment instead of using a time-lock directly. More precisely, the transaction Deposit should
be claimable with a signature of A and a random secret r, which is known only to B. It means that A can claim Deposit
using the Fuse transaction as soon as the secret string r is revealed by B. In our situation we would like the secret
to be revealed at the time t. It can be achieved by executing at the very beginning (before broadcasting the Deposit
transaction) the CS.Commit(B,A, d, t, r) protocol. In this case at the time t either: the CS commitment was opened,
the secret r is known and A can broadcast the Fuse transaction (assuming that Deposit was not spent earlier) or the CS
commitment was not opened and A gets dB from the Fuse transaction in the CS execution. The graph of transactions
is presented on Fig. 3.
CS(B,A, d, t, r)
Deposit(in: T )
in-script: sigA([Deposit ])
out-script(body , σ1, x):
(verA(body , σ1) ∧H(x) = h) ∨
. . .
val: dB
Fuse(in: Deposit)
in-script: sigA([Fuse ]), r
out-script(body , σ): verA(body , σ)
val: dB
dB dB
dB
Fig. 3. The solution with the Fuse transaction resistant to malleability. CS(B,A, d, t, r) denotes the transactions in the appropriate
execution of the CS protocol.
5 See e.g. examples 1, 5 and 7 on http://en.bitcoin.it/wiki/Contracts.
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The key difference, which makes a new construction resistant to malleability is that the Fuse transaction does not
need to be signed by B, so it can be created and signed by A after the Deposit transaction is confirmed and its hash is
known. A drawback of this construction is that the other party (B in our case) also has to make a deposit.
2.3 Fair Two-Party Computation protocol
The simultaneous BitCoin-based timed commitment scheme (SCS) described in [1] is an extended version of the CS
protocol in which two parties simultaneously commit to their secret strings. The pivotal property of this protocol is that
after the commitment phase either: both parties are committed or none of them is committed (the latter is only possible
if one of the parties misbehaved). The graph of transactions is presented on Fig. 4. Refer to [1] for more details.
The main application of the SCS protocol is the FairComputation protocol from [1], which is a general fair Two-
Party Computation protocol (refer to [1] for more details). However, in contrast to CS, the SCS protocol is vulnerable
to transaction malleability, because it requires the Fuse transactions to be created and signed before broadcasting
their input transaction. Therefore, in [1] it was assumed that the BitCoin protocol is modified in such a way, that the
transactions are no longer malleable.
In this section we present a modified version of SCS protocol called NewSCS, which is resistant to transactions
malleability and does not require any change of the BitCoin protocol. Combining it with the FairComputation protocol
from [1] it gives the general fair Two-Party Computation protocol.
Commit(in: TA, TB)
in-script1: sigA([Commit]) in-script2: sigB([Commit ])
out-script1(body, σ1, σ2, x):
(verA(body, σ1) ∧H(x) = hsA )∨
(verA(body, σ1) ∧ verB(body, σ2))
out-script2(body, σ1, σ2, x):
(verB(body, σ2) ∧H(x) = hsB )∨
(verB(body, σ2) ∧ verA(body, σ1))
val1: dB val2: dB
OpenA(in: Commit(1))
in-script:
sigA([Open
A]),⊥, sA
out-script(body, σ):
verA(body, σ)
val: dB
OpenB(in: Commit(2))
in-script:
⊥, sigB([Open
B ]), sB
out-script(body, σ):
verB(body, σ)
val: dB
FuseA(in: Commit(1))
in-script: sigA([FuseA]),
sigB([Fuse
A]),⊥
out-script(body, σ): verB(body, σ)
val: dB
tlock: t
FuseB(in: Commit(2))
in-script: sigA([FuseB]),
sigB([Fuse
B]),⊥
out-script(body, σ): verA(body, σ)
val: dB
tlock: t
dB dB
dB dB
dB dB
dB dB
dB dB
Fig. 4. The graph of transactions for the original version of the SCS protocol.
TheNewSCS protocol is a result of a straightforward application of the technique from Sec. 2.2 to the SCS protocol.
The graph of the transactions and the full description of the NewSCS protocol are presented on Fig. 5 and Fig. 6.
2.4 Other applications
In this section we list some other protocols, which can be made resistant to malleability using our technique:
– http://en.bitcoin.it/wiki/Contracts, Example 1: Providing a deposit. Although, this protocol
could be fixed using our technique, the resulting protocol would be rather impractical as it would require the
server to also make a deposit.
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– http://en.bitcoin.it/wiki/Contracts, Example 5: Trading across chains.
– http://en.bitcoin.it/wiki/Contracts, Example 7: Rapidly-adjusted (micro)payments to a pre-de-
termined party.
– Back and Bentov’s lottery protocol from [3].
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CSA(A,B, d, t, rA) CS
B(B,A, d, t, rB)
Commit(in: TA2 , TB2 )
in-script1: sigA([Commit]) in-script2: sigB([Commit ])
out-script1(body, σ, x):
(verA(body, σ) ∧H(x) = hsA ) ∨
(verB(body, σ) ∧H(x) = hrA)
out-script2(body, σ, x):
(verB(body, σ) ∧H(x) = hsB ) ∨
(verA(body, σ) ∧H(x) = hrB )
val1: dB val2: dB
OpenA(in: Commit(1))
in-script:
sig
A
([OpenA]), sA
out-script(body, σ):
verA(body, σ)
val: dB
OpenB(in: Commit(2))
in-script:
sig
B
([OpenB ]), sB
out-script(body, σ):
verB(body, σ)
val: dB
FuseA(in: Commit(1))
in-script: sig
B
([FuseA]), rA
out-script(body, σ): verB(body, σ)
val: dB
FuseB(in: Commit(2))
in-script: sig
A
([FuseB]), rB
out-script(body, σ): verA(body, σ)
val: dB
dB dB
dB dB
dB dB
dB dB
dB dB
Fig. 5. The graph of transactions for the NewSCS protocol. Two boxes labeled with CS(. . .) denote the transactions broadcast in
the appropriate execution of the CS protocol. hx denotes the value H(x), but it is used in the output scripts to stress that the value
of the hash is directly included in the transaction (instead of value of x and an application of the hash function).
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Pre-conditions:
1. A holds the key pair A and B holds the key pair B.
2. A knows the secret sA, B knows the secret sB , both players know the hashes hsA = H(sA) and hsB = H(sB).
3. There are four unredeemed transactions TA1 , TA2 and TB1 , TB2 , which can be redeemed with the keys A and B respec-
tively, each having the value of dB.
The NewSCS.CommitR(A,B, d, t, sA, sB) phase:
1. A draws a random string rA and B draws a random string rB .
2. The parties execute CS.Commit(A,B, d, t, rA) and CS.Commit(B,A, d, t, rB) using TA1 and TB1 respectively. The
former execution will be denoted CSA and the latter CSB . Recall that the parties quit the whole NewSCS protocol if
they detect the misbehavior of the other party during one of the CS.Commit executions.
The NewSCS.CommitS(A,B, d, t, sA, sB) phase:
3. Both players compute the body of the transaction Commit using TA2 and TB2 as inputs.
4. A signs the transaction Commit and sends the signature to B.
5. B signs the transaction Commit and broadcasts it.
6. Both parties wait until the transaction Commit is confirmed.
7. If the transaction Commit does not appear on the blockchain until the time t − 3maxBB , where maxBB is the maximal
possible delay between broadcasting the transaction and including it in the blockchain, then A immediately redeems the
transaction TA2 and after TA2 is redeemed she opens her CSA commitment and quits the protocol. Analogously, if A did
not send her signature to B until the time t− 3maxBB , then B opens his CSB commitment and quits the protocol.
The NewSCS.Open(A,B, d, t, sA, sB) phase:
8. A and B broadcast the transactions OpenA and OpenB respectively, what reveals the secrets sA and sB .
9. After the transactions OpenA and OpenB are confirmed, A and B open their CS commitments.
10. If A did not broadcast OpenA until time t, then depending on whether she opened her commitment CSA or not, B
broadcasts FuseA or CSA.Fuse to get extra dB (in addition to 2dB already claimed from OpenB and CSB .Open).
Similarly, if B misbehaved then A broadcasts FuseB or CSB .Fuse to get her extra dB.
Fig. 6. The description of the NewSCS protocol.
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